We consider a family of exchange economies with complete markets where consumers have multiprior preferences representing their ambiguity aversion. Under a linear independence assumption, we prove that regular economies are generic. Regular economies exhibit enjoyable properties: odd finite number of equilibrium prices, local constancy of this number, local differentiable selections of the equilibrium prices.
This differentiability is often derived from well known assumptions on the utility functions. Indeed, the utility functions are supposed to be C 2 to obtain C 1 demand functions. This does not allow the presence of kinks on indifference curves that arise in uncertainty context.
In the maxmin expected utility model due to Gilboa and Schmeidler [17] , the agents face ambiguity modeled by the multiplicity of the priors of the agents. Each agent considers the minimum expected utility over his set of priors. This "minimum" generates kinks on the indifference curves when more than one probability realize the minimum, this leads to the nondifferentiability of the demand functions. These kinks cannot be removed since they are genuinely linked to uncertainty not to modelling issues. The main objective of this paper is to get the genericity of regular economies despite that the demand functions are non-differentiable.
In this paper, we consider an exchange economy with a finite number of commodities and a finite number m of consumers. The preferences of consumer i are represented by a utility function u i from R ++ to R. The function u i is the minimum of a finite number n i of expected utility functions that satisfy the usual differentiability requirements and a linear independence assumption on the extremal priors. For example, this linear independence assumption is satisfied by ε-contamination of confidence.
We first study the properties of the demand functions. This systematic study constitutes in itself a new result concerning consumers with multiprior preferences. Indeed, we prove that the demand functions are locally Lipschitz continuous and that these functions are continuously differentiable on an open set of full Lebesgue measure.
In the second part of the paper, we follow Balasko's program. We define and parametrize the equilibrium manifold. We show that it is indeed a smooth manifold at almost every point. As in the classical case, we can propose a global parametrization from which we deduce that the equilibrium manifold is lipeomorphic 1 to an open connected subset of an Euclidean space denoted by U using similar approach than Bonnisseau and Rivera-Cayupi [5] .
We can define an extended projection using the parametrization. This mapping is continuously differentiable almost everywhere and locally Lipschitz continuous.
Contrary to the classical case, we have to take into account the kinks to define regular economies. A singular economy is either the image of a point where the extended projection is not differentiable or the image of a point where the differential mapping is not onto. A regular economy is, by definition, an economy that is not singular. By Sard's theorem since the set U and the space of economies are two manifolds of same dimension, the set of singular economies is a set of Lebesgue measure zero 2 . By the Implicit Function Theorem, each regular economy has a finite number of equilibria and, around a regular economy, there exist continuously differentiable selections of the equilibrium prices.
Computing the degree of the extended projection by an homotopy argument, we obtain that every regular economy has a finite odd number of equilibrium prices.
We now mention earlier contributions. Rader [25] showed that, when the consumers have demand functions almost everywhere differentiable satisfying property (N): "The image of a null set is a null set.", almost every economy has a finite number of equilibrium prices. In our paper, we prove that Rader's properties are satisfied by multiprior preferences but we get more with the local continuously differentiable selections.
Shannon and Rigotti [26] study market implications of the presence of ambiguity modelled by variational preferences. Variational preferences encompass multiprior preferences. They show that almost all economies are determinate which means that there exist a finite number of equilibrium prices and local continuous selections. They obtain also a Lipschitz behavior in the Choquet case. Note that regularity and determinacy are two distinct concepts, the first one implying the second one. In particular, the number of equilibria may not be constant around a determinate economy. We need the linear independence of Assumption 1 to get regularity instead of determinacy.
In [9] , Dana studies agents that are Choquet expected-utility maximizers. She is interested in equilibrium welfare properties and indeterminacy of the equilibrium. She provides a sufficient condition on equilibrium implying that there exists a continuum of equilibrium prices. But, she does not address the issue of genericity.
In [5] , Bonnisseau and Rivera-Cayupi study a non-smooth model although the failure of differentiability was not in the utility function but on the boundary of the consumption sets. They obtain demand functions with properties similar to ours.
In Section 2, we present multiprior preferences and the definition of an equilibrium with complete markets. Actually, to simplify the notation, we consider a larger class of preferences where the utility functions are defined as a minimum of a finite family of functions satisfying the usual differentiability requirements and a linear independence assumption on the gradient vectors.
In Section 3, we study extensively the demand function of a consumer with multiprior preferences. The fourth section is devoted to the global analysis of the equilibrium manifold and to the genericity analysis. Some concluding remarks are given in Section 5 and finally, some technical proofs are given in Appendix.
Multiprior preferences
We 3 study a two-period economy with a complete system of markets. There are two dates t = 0 and t = 1. There is uncertainty at date 0 about which state will occur at date 1. At date 1, there are S states of nature. We denote by ∆(S) the set of probabilities on S = {1, . . . , S}. There are I goods at each node so there are := I(1 + S) goods. We model the ambiguity by a multiplicity of probabilities.
From a general equilibrium point of view, we study a family of economies parametrized by strictly positive endowments with m consumers and commodities. We denote respectively by M and L the set of consumers and the set of commodities. Let M ≡ {1, . . . , m} and L ≡ {1, . . . , }.
For each agent i ∈ M , there exists a closed convex set P i ⊂ ∆(S). We suppose that the set P i has n i extremal points (π k i ) 1≤k≤n i . We also suppose that the set P i is contained in R S ++ to get the strict monotony of preferences. This can in particular correspond to the convex case of the C.E.U. (Choquet Expected Utility) model of Schmeidler [28] since the core of a convex capacity has at most S! extremal points (Shapley [29] ).
The agent chooses a contingent consumption vector (x s ) 1≤s≤S ∈ R IS ++ and a vector x 0 ∈ R I ++ corresponding to his consumption at date zero. The utility of the agent i is given by:
Notations. If x is a vector of R , the norm of the vector x is defined by x := h=1 = |x h |. The left-derivative of a function defined on an open interval J ⊂ R at t ∈ J is denoted by Ψ l (t). Similarly the right-derivative of Ψ at t is denoted by Ψ r (t). The vector 1 denotes the vector of R that has all coordinates equal to zero. The inner product of x and y elements of R is: x · y := h=1 x h y h . For all r > 0, B o (a, r) (respectively B c (a, r)) denotes the open (resp. closed) ball of center a and of radius r. K denotes the cardinal of the set K. The vectors are, by convention, column vectors and the transpose of a vector x is denoted by x T .
where b is : R I ++ −→ R are 1 + S functions. We define, for k ∈ {1, . . . , n i }, the function u k i by:
In many applications, the function b is does not depend on the state s. The state-dependent case in the expected utility model has been studied by Karni, Schmeidler and Vind [19] and Wakker [30] for example. For more references and a presentation of some applications, see [18] .
We posit the following assumption on the probability vectors (π k i ) 1≤k≤n i .
Assumption 1 For every i ∈ M , the probability vectors (π k i ) 1≤k≤n i are linearly independent.
Note that this assumption holds true when P i is an ε-contamination of a probabilityπ. Recall that a set P is called an ε-contamination if: P := (1 − ε){π} + ε∆(S) for some real number ε ∈]0; 1[. The extremal points of P are (1 − ε)π + επ s for s = 1, . . . , S, where π s is the probability such that π s (s) = 1. Obviously, these vectors are linearly independent. The εcontamination of confidence is a special case of the Choquet Expected Utility model. Indeed, the related capacity ν is defined by:
and the set P is its core . The weight 1 − ε can be interpreted as the degree of confidence the decision maker has in his priorπ. This model has been axiomatized by Nishimura and Ozaki [24] . The ε-contamination of confidence has the favor of many economists because it is easier to handle than general multiple prior models. Nishimura and Ozaki [23] applied this model to search behavior, Chen and Epstein [7] to portfolio choice, Epstein and Wang [13] to asset pricing and Carlier, Dana and Shahdi [6] to insurance. For more references, we refer the reader to Nishimura and Ozaki [24] and Kopylov [20] .
Let us now present the assumptions on the functions (b is ) S s=0 .
Assumption 2 For every i ∈ M , we assume:
2. ∀s = 0, . . . , S and all x s ∈ R I ++ , ∇b is (x s ) 0,
3. ∀s = 0, . . . , S and all
Assumption 3 For every i ∈ M , for all s = 0, . . . , S , if a sequence (x ν ) ν≥0 converges tox ∈ R I + andx h := 0 for some h ∈ {1, . . . , I} then 4 :
Remark 2.1 In the classical one-good case, i.e. I = 1, and in the separable case 5 , this assumption can be replaced by the following Inada condition: If a sequence (x ν ) ν≥0 converges tox ∈ R I + andx h := 0 for some h ∈ {1, . . . , I} then:
The system of markets is complete. Therefore the budget set can be described by one single constraint with contingent prices at date zero as explained in the last chapter of Debreu [10] . One can also read Chapter 2 of Magill-Quinzii [21] for more details about complete and incomplete markets in twoperiod economies. The demand f i (p, w) of consumer i with respect to the price p := (p 0 , (p s ) S s=1 ) ∈ R I(1+S) ++ and to his wealth w > 0 is the solution of the following problem:
In the next definition, we use the simplex normalization, i.e., we take prices in P with P := p ∈ R ++ , h=1 p h = 1 . We end this section by the definition of an equilibrium:
e is for all s = 0, . . . , S.
In this paper, since the preferences of the consumers are fixed, we define an economy as an element e := (e i ) m i=1 of (R ++ ) m . Therefore, the space of the economies is Ω := (R ++ ) m . 
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The aim of the paper is to prove that regular economies are generic for multiprior preferences. Regular economies exhibit enjoyable properties: odd finite number of equilibrium prices, local constancy of this number, local differentiable selections of the equilibrium prices.
Thus, even if ambiguity aversion is represented by non-differentiable multiprior preferences, economies retain generically the properties of the differentiable approach.
Remark 2.2 Balasko [1] showed that the regular economies are generic in the standard model when the total resources are fixed. This is no more true in our setting. As an example, let us consider the following multiprior model with two identical consumers, two states of the nature and two extremal priors.
The demand function defined on R 3 ++ is:
Suppose that the total resources vector is equal to r = (1, 1). The space of the economies with total resources equal to r is denoted by Ω(r). For every economy e ∈ Ω(r), the set of normalized equilibrium prices is:
The equilibrium allocations of e := ((a, b), (1 − a, 1 − b)) with a and b positive are
. So all the economies are singular in Ω(r).
A larger class of preferences
To simplify the notations, we consider a larger class of preferences and prove that the aforementioned properties are satisfied for this class of preferences. Namely, we prove the genericity of regular economies and obtain the classical properties of these economies. 7 We assume that the preferences of consumer i ∈ M are represented by a utility function u i from R ++ to R which is the minimum of n i functions:
We state the following assumptions on the utility functions.
Assumption 4 For all i ∈ M , for all k ∈ {1, .., n i },
For all x ∈ R ++ , M i (x) denotes the set of the indices of the functions realizing the minimum, i.e.
Remark 2.3 Assumption 4 tells us that the preferences are continuous, monotone and strictly convex. Moreover, each commodity is desirable. For i ∈ M and k ∈ {1, . . . , n i }, Assumption 6 on the function u k i is weaker than the usual assumption: for all x ∈ R ++ , the closure in R of the set {x ∈ R ++ |u k i (x ) ≥ u k i (x)} is contained in R ++ . The usual closure assumption implies Assumption 6 but both assumptions are not equivalent. For instance, the function u defined on R 2
satisfies Assumption 6 but not the classical assumption 6 .
The next proposition shows that the multiprior preferences satisfy Assumptions 4, 5 and 6. 
We first sketch the proof. To simplify the notation, we skip the index i during the proof and denote the function u k i by u k . In Lemma 6.1, we establish the continuity of f as a consequence of Berge's Theorem. Then, in Lemma 6.3, we obtain that this function is locally Lipschitz continuous thanks to Cornet-Vial [8] . Thanks to Rademacher's Theorem, f is differentiable on a setΩ that has full Lebesgue measure. Following Fiacco-McCormick [15] , we prove in Lemma 6.4 that the function f is continuously differentiable around (p,w) whenever the strict complementarity slackness is satisfied at (p,w) for the optimization problem related to the demand. To conclude, in Lemma 3.1, we show that the function f is not differentiable at (p,w) when the strict complementarity slackness is not satisfied.
More precisely, let us rewrite the optimization problem defining the demand. As explained above, the function u is not differentiable a priori. Therefore Problem 3.1 is not in standard form. Considering this, we rewrite this problem in a standard form where the functions at stake are twice continuously differentiable. To do so, we remark that, for all (p, w) ∈ R ++ ×]0, +∞[, f (p, w) is the solution of the following problem:
The first order conditions related to this problem are the following: there
Note that this maximization problem is not necessarily convex since the constraint t − u k (x) may not be quasi-convex. Nevertheless, the first order conditions are necessary since the Mangasarian-Fromovitz qualification condition is satisfied and sufficient as shown in Appendix. Furthermore, the linear independence Assumption 5 implies that the multiplier is unique. Now, let Ω 0 defined by:
We prove that the set Ω 0 is an open set on which the function f is continuously differentiable by Lemma 6.4 and that the set of differentiability points ofΩ has full Lebesgue measure thanks to Lemma 6.3 and Rademacher's Theorem. In Lemma 3.1, we show that the function f is not differentiable at any point outside Ω 0 which meansΩ = Ω 0 . Therefore we conclude that f is continuously differentiable on an open set of full Lebesgue measure. Lemma 3.1 constitutes the keystep of the proof and is obtained reasoning by contradiction. We construct a price path t → p(t) with p(t) =p and show that the function t → u k [f (p(t), p(t) · f (p,w))] is not differentiable at zero for any k ∈ M (f (p,w)) such that the corresponding multiplier is equal to zero.
All we have to prove is the following Lemma.
For the remaining of the section, we write:x := f (p,w) andλ k := λ k (p,w) for k ∈ {1, . . . , n + 1}. Since the strict complementarity slackness condition does not hold, M (f (p,w)) can be decomposed the following way: M (f (p,w)) = K ∪ K with K and K subsets of {1, . . . , n},λ k > 0 for k ∈ K,λ k = 0 for k ∈ K and K = ∅. Note that we have: K = ∅ sincē p = 0 and k∈Kλ k = 1 since K∪K λ k = 1 andλ k = 0 for every k ∈ K .
We define the functionf on R ++ by:f (p) := f (p, p ·x).
In the proof of Lemma 3.1, we use some auxiliary functions that we introduce now. We define a generalized Hicksian demand ∆ K and a demand function f K both related to the functions (u k ) k∈K . Based on f K , we also define the functionsf K andv K .
A generalized Hicksian demand and the related expenditure function:
The related expenditure function is defined by:
The map ∆ K has been extensively studied in [4] . This map is continuously differentiable with respect to (p, v) around the point (p,v K ) since the multipliers related to the satiated constraints are positive and the gradients (∇u k (x)) k∈K are linearly independent which holds true thanks to Assumption 5. Note also that ∆ K (p,v K ) =x. Indeed the necessary and sufficient first order conditions are satisfied byx. Moreover, all the constraints are satiated and have positive related multipliers.
Like the classical expenditure function, the function e K is concave with respect to p so almost everywhere twice differentiable and satisfies D 2 p e K = D p ∆ K whenever this expression makes sense 8 .
The next lemma is a generalization of a well known result about the Slutsky matrix.
This result is proved in Appendix.
An auxiliary demand function:
We define the demand function f K related to the utility functions (u k ) k∈K . f K (p, w) is the solution of the optimization problem:
Note that we have: f K (p,w) =x = f (p,w) since the necessary and sufficient first order conditions are satisfied byx. Indeed, we have:λ k = 0 for all k ∈ K . The function f K is continuously differentiable around (p,w) since all the multipliers are positive. See Lemma 6.4. We define on R ++ the functionf K by:
Indeed, from the necessary and sufficient first order conditions,f K (p) = ∆ K (p,v K (p)) for p close enough top because the functionv K and the multipliers corresponding to Problem 3.5 are continuous 9 and the multipliers are all positive at (p,v K ). To conclude, we point out the following facts:
• for p close enough top, we have:f K (p) = ∆ K (p,v K (p)),
• The functions f K ,f K , ∆ K andv K are continuously differentiable respectively locally around (p,w),p, (p,v) andp.
The following result relates the partial derivative with respect to p of the compensated demand ∆ K and the differential of the demandf K at the pricē p and provides an important result concerning the functions (v k K ) k∈K . Lemma 3.3 For all k ∈ K, ∇v k K (p) = 0. Moreover we have:
The proof is given in Appendix.
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Recall that we have: M (f (p,w)) = K ∪ K with K and K subsets of {1, . . . , n} and thatλ k > 0 for k ∈ K andλ k = 0 for k ∈ K .
We now consider a particular price path p(.) to get the desired result. Let E be the vector space spanned by the family ∇u k (x) k∈K and Φ :=
On the other hand, the family (∇u k (x)) k∈K∪K is linearly independent from Assumption 5.
Thanks to Proposition 6.1, there exists (α k ) k∈K in R K ++ such that, for all k ∈ K ,
For all t ∈ J :=] − a, a[ 10 , let : 11 . As a preliminary remark, we see that the functions (φ k ) k∈K and (ṽ k ) k∈K are differentiable on a neighborhood of zero. Indeed, the functions (u k ) n k=1 are differentiable, the functionf K is differentiable aroundp, p(0) =p and p(.) is a differentiable path on J.
Proof of Claim 3.1 For t > 0 small enough, thanks to the formula 3.7, one remarks thatx satisfies the necessary and sufficient first order conditions related to the problem:
The number a is a positive number sufficiently small to ensure that p(t) belongs to R ++ for all t ∈ J. 11 To avoid any confusion, we denote with"ϕ"s the functions for k ∈ K and with"v"s the functions for k ∈ K.
for the budget constraint 12 . Therefore we can conclude thatx is a solution of the problem, that is:
From Lemma 3.3 and the choice of the family (α k ) k∈K , we obtain the following claim:
Proof of Claim 3.2 By the chain rule, Lemma 3.3 and Equation (3.6), we have for k ∈ K :
Now we consider the last claim. Claim 3.3f K (p(t)) =f (p(t)) for t < 0 sufficiently near from zero. Consequently, the left-derivative (ϕ k ) l (0) is negative for every k ∈ K .
Proof of Claim 3. 3 We first say that the constraints corresponding to k ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ M (f (p, w)) are inactive for t < 0 sufficiently small by continuity of the functions at stake. Summarizing what we obtained before, we have:
The last equality comes from the following equalities:
From these three facts, we get: (φ k ) (t) >v k (t) for all (k, k ) ∈ K × K and t < 0 sufficiently near from zero. Thereforef K (p(t)) is feasible for t close enough to zero for Problem 3.2 defining the demand f (p(t), p(t) ·x). It satisfies the necessary and sufficient first order conditions and the multipliers 12 See Equation 6.3. 14 are given by the multipliers related to Problem 3.5 completed by zeroes for k ∈ K and k / ∈ M [f (p,w)]. Sincef K (p(t)) =f (p(t)) for t < 0 close enough to zero, we have ϕ k (t) =φ k (t) for t < 0 close enough to zero for all k ∈ K . We conclude: (ϕ k ) l (0) < 0 for every k ∈ K by Claim 3.2.
Finally, for every k ∈ K , from Claim 3.3, the left derivative of ϕ k at 0 is negative while the right derivative of ϕ k at 0 is equal to zero by Claim 3.1. Therefore the functions (ϕ k ) k∈K are not differentiable at zero, which implies that the function f is not differentiable at (p,w).
The equilibrium manifold
In this section, we study the equilibrium price vectors from a global point of view following Balasko [1] . The monotony of the utility functions implies that the equilibrium prices are always strictly positive. Moreover they are defined up to a normalization. We use the simplex normalization, i.e., we take prices in S with S := p ∈ R ++ , h=1 p h = 1 . We now define the equilibrium manifold and the natural projection. (ii) The equilibrium manifold E eq is the set of the pairs (p, e) ∈ S × Ω with p equilibrium price for the economy e. An element (p, e) of the set E eq is called an equilibrium point.
In our framework, the equilibrium manifold 13 is not necessarily smooth and we cannot directly apply the classical arguments of differential topology. Nevertheless, we parametrize the equilibrium manifold and exploit the results of the previous section.
We recall that 1 denotes the vector whose coordinates are all equal to 1 and by 1 ⊥ the vector space orthogonal to the vector 1. We define the mapping
Let us define the set U by
Now we define the subset V of U, as follows: an element (p, Proof
For the remaining of the proof, we will use extensively the following result.
For all x ∈ R and all p ∈ S, we have:
We show that the set U is arcconnected. Let
Our goal is to connect ξ 1 to ξ 2 . We introduce two intermediate points:
We show that we can construct a continuous path between ξ k and χ k , k = 1, 2 and another one between χ 1 and χ 2 , theses paths taking values in U which gives us the result. We first remark that Formula 4.2 implies that θ 2 (χ k ) = (f i (p k , w k i )) m i=1 for k = 1, 2. Paths between ξ k and χ k For k = 1, 2, for all t ∈ [0, 1], let ζ kt := (1 − t)ξ k + tχ k . This defines a continuous path between ξ k and χ k . ζ kt belongs to U for all t since θ 2 is linear with respect to the variables (η i ) m−1 i=1 and (R ++ ) m is convex. Path between χ 1 and χ 2 For all t ∈ [0, 1], we define p t := (1 − t)p 1 + tp 2 and w t i := (1 − t)w 1 i + tw 2 i for all i = 1, . . . , m. The vector
) defines a continuous path between χ 1 and χ 2 thanks to the continuity of the demand functions and belongs to U since
We conclude that the set U is arcconnected. Now, we introduce the map θ from U to E eq to parametrize the equilibrium manifold. For ξ = (p,
Note that the range of the map θ is contained in E eq . Let e i = θ 2 i (ξ). From the formula defining θ 2 , one has p · e i = w i , from the definition of U, e i 0 for all i in M and from the formula for
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The other map that we consider is the following:
Note that the range of the map φ is contained in U. Indeed, from Formula
belongs to (R ++ ) m . We now state the properties of θ and φ, which imply that E eq is a manifold parametrized by θ. 5. E eq is lipeomorphic to U.
Proof The proof is based on the properties of the demand functions.
1. As already noticed above, from Formula 4.2, for all (p,
) ∈ U, the definition of θ 2 and Walras law imply that p · θ 2 i (ξ) = w i for i = 1, . . . , m, and proj 1 ⊥ θ 2 i (ξ) = η i for i = 1, . . . , m − 1. So, φ • θ(ξ) = ξ.
Hence, φ = θ −1 and φ and θ are one-to-one and onto. 2. θ and φ are locally Lipschitz and continuous since the demand functions f i are so.
3. Since the set (S × R) \ Ω 0 i ∩ (S × R) is a closed set of Lebesgue measure zero for each i ∈ M , the set U \ V is closed in U and has Lebesgue measure zero from Fubini's Theorem.
4. The map θ is C 1 on V from the definition of V and the properties of the demand function f i on Ω 0 i . 5. This is a consequence of 1. and 2.
Following Balasko [1] , let us introduce the natural projection as well as the extended projection.
Definition 4.2 (The natural projection)
The natural projection π is the map from E eq to Ω defined by:
π :
E eq −→ Ω (p, e) −→ e (4.5)
The map Π := π • θ is called the extended projection. There are different concepts of regularity for non-smooth mappings. In this paper, a regular point is a point where the mapping is differentiable and the differential mapping is onto. A value is regular if all pre-images are regular points. A value is singular if it is not regular.
Definition 4.3
The economy e := (e i ) i∈M is called regular if e / ∈ Π(U \ V) and if the differential of Π at all the pre-images of e is onto. An economy which is not regular is called singular. E r denotes the set of regular economies and E s the set of singular economies.
The following result is the extension of one of the cornerstones of the differentiable approach of general equilibrium theory. Proof E r is open and has full Lebesgue measure. We have already seen that Π(U \ V) is a closed null set. The set of the critical points of Π |V is closed in V, hence this set has the form V ∩ C where C is a set closed in U. Remark that we have the equalities:
We deduce that the set E s is a closed set since the map Π is proper. This set has Lebesgue measure zero by Sard's Theorem and the previous theorem. Hence, E r is an open set of full Lebesgue measure.
E r is dense. Indeed, the set E s is a set of Lebesgue measure zero, so its complement E r is dense.
The following result summarizes the properties of regular economies. It is a direct consequence of the Implicit Function Theorem. We now turn ourselves to the computation of the degree of Π. We first remark that the mapping Π is not continuously differentiable. So we cannot use the classical definition of the degree. Therefore we consider the degree for continuous mappings 15 . Since the set U is unbounded, the definition of the degree needs some properness assumption 16 . Proof We consider the extended projection Π 1 corresponding to consumers having as utility functions the functions u 1 i . 17 The map 18 
We first show that the inverse image of every compact subset K of Ω is a compact subset of S × R m
, t ν ν≥0 of F −1 (K). We denote by (e ν ) ν≥0 the sequence of K defined by e ν := F (ξ ν , t ν ) for ν ≥ 0. The sequence (ξ ν , t ν ) ν≥0 remains in a compact set ofS × R m × (1 ⊥ ) m−1 × [0, 1]. Indeed, the first and the last components lie in a compact set by definition. Moreover, the set
Since p ∈S and since the set K is contained in Ω, every element a ∈ A is positive i.e. a ∈ R m ++ . By Walras law and the definition of F , w ν i = p ν · e ν i for all i = 1, . . . , m and all ν ≥ 0. Hence, the sequence ((w ν i ) m i=1 ) ν≥0 lies in the compact set A. The compactness of the set K and the continuity of the projection map imply that the sequence (η ν i := proj 1 ⊥ e ν i ) ν≥0 lies in a compact subset of 1 ⊥ . To conclude, up to a subsequence, the sequence (ξ ν , t ν ) ν≥0 converges to a vector (ξ :
belongs to A so the real numberw i is positive for all i = 1, . . . , m. Now, we have to prove that this vector belongs to F −1 (K). Thanks to the continuity of F and to the closedness of K, it suffices to prove that the pricep belongs to S. By definition of F , Π and Π 1 , the m-th component
] for ν ≥ 0. We first remark that, for all i = 1, . . . , m, (e ν i ) ν≥0 is bounded since (e ν ) ν≥0 belongs to the compact set K. We also remark that f i (p ν , w ν i ) and f 1 i (p ν , w ν i ) are positive. If (p ν ) ν≥0 converged top in ∂S and (w ν i ) i∈M,ν≥0 converged to some element (w i ) i∈M ∈ R m ++ then f 1 i (p ν , w ν i ) and f i (p ν , w ν i ) would go to +∞ as ν goes to infinity for all i ∈ M by monotony of the functions (u i ) i∈M and (u 1 i ) i∈M . So F m (ξ ν , t ν ) would go to +∞, which contradicts that F (ξ ν , t ν ) belongs to the compact set K for all ν ≥ 0.
Since Ω is connected, the degree does not depend on the choice of the element where it is computed. Letē ∈ Ω defined, for i ∈ M , byē i : r) be a closed ball of center e contained in Ω 19 and B := B o (ē, r) the open ball of same center and same radius. We know that the set F −1 (B) is a compact set. The set F −1 (B) contains F −1 ({ē}) and is an open set, by the continuity of F , contained in
We now define the set ϑ := proj S×R m [1] , the degree modulo 2 atē of F 0 is equal to 1 21 . Since F −1 0 ({ē}) is contained in ϑ, the degree ofF 0 is also equal to the degree of F 0 by Property (d2) of the degree (See Deimling [12] .). The degree ofF 1 atē is also equal to 1 sinceF is a continuous homotopy. Since F −1 1 ({ē}) is contained in ϑ, the degree of Π atē is equal to the degree ofF 1 . In conclusion, the degree of Π is equal to 1.
Hence, for all e ∈ Ω, Π −1 ({e}) = ∅, which means that there exists an equilibrium for every economy e ∈ Ω. The third point is a consequence of the fact that Π is locally C 1 around all the pre-images of a regular economy using that the degree of Π is equal to 1.
Concluding remarks
This paper provides a contribution in the analysis of the individual behavior and in the global analysis of the equilibrium with multiprior preferences. The first main result is that, under an assumption of linear independence of the priors, the demand of a consumer with multiprior preferences is locally Lipschitz and continuously differentiable on an open set of full Lebesgue measure. Using Rader [25] and this result, we derive that almost every economy has a finite number of equilibrium prices.
The second main result concerns the genericity of regular economies. We have recovered the usual results of the global analysis of economic equilibrium from a differentiable viewpoint. Beyond most of the previous contributions in non-smooth cases, we have obtained not only that almost every economy has a finite number of equilibrium prices but that there exists an open set of full Lebesgue measure on which the result holds true. Moreover, we have proven that the equilibrium price selections are continuously differentiable. Furthermore, regular economies enjoy good properties like the local constancy of the number of equilibrium prices.
The only restriction is the requirement of linear independence of the gradients. First note that this requirement is easy to check. Then, remark that this requirement is always satisfied when the agents have at most two "extremal" priors. It remains open to study cases where not all but just some of the "extremal" priors are linearly independent. Since ∇b is (x s ) 0 for all s = 0, . . . , S by Assumption 2, we get for s ∈ {1, . . . , S}:
By the linear independence of the probability vectors (π k i ) n k=1 , we conclude that γ k = 0 for k ∈ M (x). Hence, the gradient vectors (∇u k i (x)) k∈M (x) are linearly independent. So, the functions (u k i ) 1≤k≤n i satisfy Assumption 5. By simple computation, Assumption 3 implies that Assumption 6 is satisfied.
Details of the proof of Proposition 3.1 Let us summarize what follows. First we present the first order conditions characterizing the demand f (p, w). Then, we consider a compact neighborhood Ξ of an arbitrary element (p,w) ∈ R ++ ×]0, +∞[. We define a ε-budget set and also a demand function f ε corresponding to this budget set. We show that this demand function is singled valued and continuous on Ξ. Thirdly, we show that for someε > 0, fε(p, w) satisfies the first order conditions characterizing f (p, w) for every (p, w) ∈ Ξ. We conclude that f (p, w) is a singleton for every (p, w) ∈ R ++ ×]0, +∞[ and that f is continuous on R ++ ×]0, +∞[ in Lemma 6.1. Finally, we show that f is locally Lipschitz on R ++ ×]0, +∞[ in Lemma 6.3. In Lemma 6.4, we show that the function f is continuously differentiable locally around (p,w) ∈ Ω 0 . First order characterization of Problem 3.2.
f (p, w) is the solution of the problem:
Let us introduce the functions τ :
(t, x) are the variables and (p, w) the parameters. The gradients and the Hessian matrix with respect to (t, x) are given for all (t, x, p, w) ∈ R × R ++ × R ++ ×]0, +∞[ by:
• ∇τ (t, x, p, w) = −1 0 ,
for k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
• ∇g n+1 (t, x, p, w) = 0 p ,
The function τ is linear, the constraint functions (g k ) n+1 k=1 are twice differentiable and satisfy: ∇g k (t, x, p, w) = 0 for all k = 1, . . . , n +1 and (t, x, p, w) ∈ R × R ++ × R ++ ×]0, +∞[. The first order conditions related to this problem are: if (t, x) is a solution, there exists λ = (λ k ) 1≤k≤n+1 ∈ R n+1 + such that :
Note that we have: {k ∈ {1, . . . , n}|g k (t, x, p, w) = 0} = M (x). Thus, the multipliers λ k are equal to zero for k / ∈ M (x). From the above formula for the gradients, these conditions can be rewritten as follows:
First order conditions are necessary and sufficient. The first order conditions are necessary because Mangasarian-Fromovitz condition for the qualification of the constraints is satisfied everywhere. Indeed, for α > 0 large enough, (−α, −1) · ∇g k (t, x, p, w) < 0 for all k = 1, . . . , n + 1.
We now check that these conditions are sufficient. Let (t, x, λ) satisfying these conditions. By the first equation and the fact that the vectors (∇u k (x)) n k=1 and p are elements of R ++ , we deduce that λ n+1 is necessarily positive, which implies that the budget constraint is binding. If (t, x) is not a solution of 6.1, there exists (t , x ) such that t > t, t ≤ u k (x ) for k = 1, . . . , n and p · x ≤ w. Since u k is strictly quasi-concave with a nonvanishing gradient, for all k ∈ M (x), one has
which implies that p · x > p · x = w in contradiction with p · x ≤ w. So, the first order conditions are sufficient.
In the next lemma, we prove that f (p, w) is a singleton and f is continuous. Since the budget set is not closed, we need first to consider an intermediary problem.
A ε-problem For ε > 0, f ε (p, w) is defined as the solution of the following optimization problem:
We define the ε-budget set by: Proof of Lemma 6.2 Let (p,w) ∈ R ++ ×]0, +∞[ and ε > 0 smaller than ε :=w 2 h=1p h . Such a choice implies that the interior of the set B ε (p, w) is nonempty on a compact neighborhood Ξ of (p,w). For all (p, w) ∈ Ξ, the set B ε (p, w) is a nonempty, compact and convex set. Thus, by Weierstrass Theorem, the set f ε (p, w) is nonempty. By the strict quasi-concavity of the function u 22 , the set f ε (p, w) is a singleton.
On Ξ, the interior of B ε (p, w) is nonempty. We now prove that the function (p, w) −→ f ε (p, w) is continuous on Ξ. This is a consequence of Berge's Theorem [3] since the correspondence B ε is both upper semi-continuous and lower semi-continuous on Ξ.
On Ξ, the set B ε (p, w) remains in a fixed compact set K. Hence the upper semi-continuity of B ε is equivalent to the closedness of its graph, which is a consequence of the continuity of the budget constraint.
We now show that the correspondence B ε is lower semi-continuous. Let us first introduce the correspondenceB ε defined on Ξ by:B ε (p, w) := {x ∈ R |p · x < w, x h > ε , h = 1, . . . , }. The correspondenceB ε has an open graph by the continuity of the constraints. SoB ε is lower semi-continuous. SinceB ε (p, w) is nonempty for every (p, w) ∈ Ξ and the closure ofB ε (p, w) is B ε (p, w), we deduce that the correspondence B ε is lower semi-continuous since the closure of a lower semi-continuous correspondence is lower semicontinuous 23 . Proof of Lemma 6.1. Since the function u is strictly quasi-concave and the budget set is convex, f (p, w) contains at most one element.
First we show that for someε > 0, fε(p, w) satisfies the first order conditions characterizing f (p, w) for every (p, w) ∈ Ξ. We conclude that f (p, w) is a singleton for every (p, w) ∈ R ++ ×]0, +∞[ and that f is continuous on R ++ ×]0, +∞[. To use the first order conditions, we rewrite Problem 6.4 as we did since the function u is not differentiable. For all (p, w) ∈ R ++ ×]0, +∞[, f ε (p, w) is the solution of the following problem:
5)
This problem is similar to Problem 6.1 except that there are additional constraints, ε − x h ≤ 0, h = 1, . . . , .
As before, the necessary first order conditions can be written: if (t, x) is a solution of 6.5, there exists λ ε = (λ ε k ) 0≤k≤n+1 ∈ R n+1 + and µ ε ∈ R + such that :
Note that {k ∈ {1, . . . , n}|g k (t, x, p, w) = 0} = M (x). Thus, the multipliers λ ε k are equal to zero for k / ∈ M (x). Since λ ε n+1 = 0, p · x = w and the choice of ε small enough implies that at least one constraint ah is not binding. The first order conditions are necessary because Mangasarian-Fromovitz qualification condition is satisfied everywhere. Indeed, for α > 0 large enough, (−α, −1h) · ∇g k (t, x, p, w) < 0 for all k = 1, . . . , n + 1 24 . The satiated additional constraints are affine and we have: (−α, −1h) · ∇a h (t, x, p, w) = 0.
Our goal is to show that there existsε > 0 such that the multipliers related to the constraints (a h ) h=1 are equal to zero for all (p, w) in Ξ. We reason by contradiction. Otherwise, there would exist a decreasing sequence 25 (ε q ) q≥0 that converges to zero and a sequence of Ξ denoted by (p q , w q ) q≥0 such that µ εq (p q , w q ) = 0.
By compactness, we remark that the sequence (x q := f εq (p q , w q )) q≥0 converges, up to a subsequence, to an elementx belonging to the boundary of R ++ and that the sequence (p q , w q ) q≥0 converges, up to a subsequence, to some element (p,ŵ) ∈ Ξ. In particular, remark thatŵ is positive and that p is different from zero. With a slight abuse of notation, we denote the converging subsequences as the original sequences. We write, for q ∈ N and k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, α . We have, for all q ≥ 0,
0 ≤ µ εq ≤ p q implies that (µ εq ) q≥ 0 is a bounded sequence. Since all the terms are non-negative in the second equation, for all q ∈ N, we have:
Hence:
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and q ∈ N. From Assumption 6, we obtain, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
So , for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Finally, from 6.7, µ εq · x q = ε q µ εq · 1 = ε q µ εq converges to zero. Hence, summing the above limits, p q · x q p q converges to zero which contradictsp ·x p = w p > 0.
Therefore, there existsε > 0 such that µε = 0. Thus, fε satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions related to 6.5 for all (p, w) in Ξ. So f = fε on Ξ and the continuity of f follows.
The following lemma is a consequence of the result of Cornet and Vial [8] . 
+ . Assumption (C.1) is satisfied. We show that, at a solution (t, x) of 6.1, the vectors (∇g k (t, x, p, w)) k∈M (x) and ∇g n+1 (t, x, p, w) are linearly independent. Let a vector (γ k ) k∈M (x) , γ n+1 ∈ R M (x)+1 such that:
We obtain:
If γ n+1 = 0, then γ k = 0 for every k ∈ M (x) because the vectors (∇u k (x)) k∈M (x) are linearly independent by Assumption 5.
If γ n+1 = 0, we get by the first order conditions:
So we have:
for every k ∈ M (x) by Assumption 5. But we get a contradiction since:
Assumption (C.2) is satisfied. Let (t, x) be a solution of 6.1 with a corresponding multiplier λ := (λ k ) n+1 k=1 . Let us introduce the set K(x) := {k ∈ M (x)|λ k > 0}. We have to check that, for all h ∈ R +1 , h = 0 such that: ∇τ (t, x, p, w) · h = 0 and ∇g k (t, x, p, w) · h = 0 for k ∈ K(x) ∪ {n + 1}, we have:
Since we have : D 2 τ ≡ 0 and D 2 g n+1 ≡ 0. It remains to show that:
whereh is the vector of R deduces from h by deleting the first component.
Since ∇τ (t, x, p, w) · h = 0 and ∇g k (t, x, p, w) · h = 0 for every k ∈ K(x) ∪ {n + 1}, one obtains h 0 = 0 with the first equality and ∇u k (x) ·h = 0 for k ∈ K(x). Soh = 0 and the inequality is then a consequence of Assumption 4. From [8] , the function f is locally Lipschitz on R ++ ×]0, +∞[ and by Rademacher's Theorem, the function f is almost everywhere differentiable.
The following lemma is a consequence of the Implicit Function Theorem and its proof is quite standard borrowing ideas from Fiacco McCormick [15] . Proof Recall that we have: ∀k ∈ M (f (p,w)), λ k (p,w) > 0. In this proof, we use the following notations:x := f (p,w) andλ k := λ k (p,w) for k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. To simplify the notation, without loss of generality, we suppose that we have: M (f (p,w)) = {1, . . . , r}. Then, locally around (p,w), by the continuity of the demand function and of the functions (u k ) 1≤k≤n , (u(f (p, w), f (p, w)) is the solution of the following problem:
As already shown, since the first order optimality conditions are necessary and sufficient, the element (u (f (p, w) ), f (p, w)) and the related multipliers (λ 1 (p, w) , . . . , λ r (p, w), λ n+1 (p, w)) are solution of G(t, x, λ, p, w) = 0 where G is defined by:
To show that the function f and the multipliers are continuously differentiable on a neighborhood of (p,w), from the Implicit Function Theorem, it suffices to show that A, the partial Jacobian matrix of G with respect to (t, x, λ), has full column rank.
It is sufficient to prove that A   ∆t ∆x ∆λ   = 0 implies: (∆t, ∆x∆λ) = (0, 0, 0).
∆t is a real number, ∆x is a column vector of dimension and ∆λ is a column vector of dimension r + 1. We obtain the system: r k=1 ∆λ k = 0 (6.9) r k=1 [λ k D 2 u k (x)∆x + ∆λ k ∇u k (x)] − ∆λ n+1p = 0 (6.10) ∆t − ∆x · ∇u k (x) = 0 ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , r} (6.11) ∆x ·p = 0 (6.12) From Equations 6.11, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , r},λ k ∆t −λ k ∆x · ∇u k (x) = 0. Summing over k, we obtain: Sinceλ n+1p = r k=1λ k ∇u k (x), we get: r k=1λ k ∆t − ∆x ·λ n+1p = 0 From 6.12 and the fact that r =1λ k = 1, we deduce: ∆t = 0. Thanks to 6.11, ∆x · ∇u k (x) = 0 ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , r} which impliesp · ∆x = 0 sinceλ n+1p = r k=1λ k ∇u k (x) andλ n+1 > 0. So if ∆x = 0, from Assumption 4, ∆x · D 2 u k (x)∆x < 0 ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , r}.
Doing an inner product of 6.10 by ∆x, we get: r k=1λ k ∆x · D 2 u k (x)∆x + r k=1 (∆λ k ∇u k (x) · ∆x) − ∆λ n+1p · ∆x = 0 which becomes: r k=1λ k ∆x · D 2 u k (x)∆x = 0, which is in contradiction with ∆x · D 2 u k (x)∆x < 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , r} recalling that the multipliersλ k are all positive. Hence, we get ∆x = 0.
Sinceλ n+1p = r k=1λ k ∇u k (x), 6.10 becomes: r k=1 ∆λ k − ∆λ n+1 λ n+1λ k ∇u k (x) = 0.
By Assumption 5, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , r}, ∆λ k = ∆λ n+1 λ n+1λ k . From 6.9, we have:
So ∆λ n+1 = 0 and finally, ∆λ k = 0 for k = 1, . . . , r.
Proof of Lemma 3. 2 We first recall that D p ∆(p,v) is the Hessian matrix of the expenditure function e K (.,v). Since the map e K (.,v) is concave, D p ∆(p,v) defines a symmetric negative semi-definite bilinear form. For p ∈ R ++ sufficiently near fromp , ∆ K (p,v) is characterized by the first order conditions:
• u k (∆ K (p,v)) =v k , ∀k ∈ K,
• p = k∈K µ k (p)∇u k (∆ K (p,v)) with µ k (p) > 0 ∀k ∈ K.
We differentiate the first condition with respect to p and obtain atp for all q ∈ R : ∇u k (∆ K (p,v)) · D p ∆ K (p,v)(q) = ∇u k (x) · D p ∆ K (p,v)(q) = 0 ∀k ∈ K.
These equalities tell us that the image of D p ∆ K (p,v) is contained in the linear subspace ∩ k∈K ∇u k (x) ⊥ of dimension − K 26 . Furthermore, since D p ∆ K (p,v) is negative semi-definite, ∇u k (x) belongs to its kernel for all k ∈ K. Thus, the dimension of the image of D p ∆ K (p,v) is at most − K. We differentiate the second condition with respect to p. We have for q ∈ R :
For all q ∈ ∩ k∈K ∇u k (x) ⊥ , we have: q = k∈K µ k (p)D 2 u k (x) D p ∆ K (p,v)(q).
So we have for q ∈ ∩ k∈K ∇u k (x) ⊥ : D p ∆ K (p,v)(q) = 0 =⇒ q = 0.
So the kernel of the restriction on ∩ k∈K ∇u k (x) ⊥ of D p ∆ K (p,v) is reduced to zero. So the rank of D p ∆ K (p,v) is at least − K. Hence, the rank of D p ∆ K (p,v) is equal to − K and the kernel of D p ∆ K (p,v) is equal to L ∇u k (x) , k ∈ K .
Proof of Lemma 3.3 By Walras law, p ·f K (p) = p ·x.
Differentiating with respect to p, we obtain for all q ∈ R :
q ·f K (p) + p · Df K (p)(q) = q ·x .
Sincex =f K (p), this implies:p · Df K (p)(q) = 0. Let k ∈ K. By the chain rule: ∇v k K (p) · q = ∇u k (f K (p)) · Df K (p)(q).
so that for all i, Φ(ξ i , k j=1 (α j + t)ξ j ) > 0, hence (α j + t) k j=1 ∈ R k ++ and the conclusion of the proposition holds true.
We now prove by contraposition that C ∩ R k ++ is nonempty. If it is not true, we apply a separation theorem between C and R k ++ , so there exists an element λ ∈ R k \ {0} such that for (c, d) ∈ C × R k ++ , λ · c ≤ λ · d. Using usual arguments, one deduces that λ ∈ R k + and λ · c ≤ 0 for all c ∈ C. Let α = (1/ k j=1 λ j )λ. Thenᾱ ∈ S. Letc = (Φ(ξ i , k j=1ᾱ j ξ j )) k i=1 , thenc ∈ C. We remark that:
So Φ( k i=1 λ i ξ i , k j=1 λ j ξ j ) ≤ 0 and since Φ is positive definite, this implies that k j=1 λ j ξ j = 0. Hence, since the family (ξ i ) k i=1 is linearly independent, one concludes that λ j = 0 for j = 1, . . . , k, which contradicts λ = 0.
